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In 1912 the Royal Navy was about to build their " E " class sub-
marines when Australia decided to complement its own first fleet 
with two submarines. These submarines were designated/4.£'. 7 and 
A.E.2. They were built at Barrow-in-Furness, Lancashire, England 
by Vicker & Sons and Maxim Ltd. (known as Vickers Maxim.) They 
were launched in 1913 and completed during that year; cornmissioned 
into the Royal Australian Navy (R.A.N.) at Portsmouth on 28 
February, 1914 and after an epic voyage arrived in Sydney on 24 
May, 1914 where they were greeted tumultuously by Australians and 
accorded considerable publicity for their feat.' The contemporary 
newspaper articles and other documents reveal that Australians were 
particularly proud of the addition of these two modern submarines 
to their Australian fleet. 
At the time of the outbreak of World War 1 on 5 August, 1914 
the Australian fleet of Australia, Melbourne and Encounter (lent 
from the Admiralty as Brisbane was still being built) were coaling 
in Sydney, and Sydney and the three destroyers were similarly engag-
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ed in Townsville. The two submarines were still undergoing refit at 
Garden Island dockyard, Sydney. Rear Admiral Patey was flying 
his flag in the Australia, having steamed south from the squadron 
winter cruise off the coast of Queensland on receipt of news of the 
imminence of the war. By way of general interest it might be men-
tioned that the Naval Board then consisted of Senator E. D. Millen 
as the Mimster tor Detence, Rear Admiral Sir William CresweU, 
K.C.M.G., R.A.N., as First Naval Member and Engineer-Captain 
W. Clarkson, C.M.G., R.A.N, as Third Naval Member. War Orders 
were issued in late July by the Department of Defence and those 
for the two submarines included that they were to "remain based 
in Sydney for the present until the Submarine Depot Ship Platypus 
is ready for service", and that Protector was to act as Seagoing 
Tender for the submarines until Platypus was ready. {Platypus was 
being built m the United Kingdom as a depot ship for the submarines 
but she did not come to Australia until after the end of the war.) 
In the Imperial Conference of 1911 it had been agreed that in time 
of war the Australian ships would be placed under Admiralty con-
trol. The Australian Naval Defence Act of I9I2 conferred power 
on the Governor-General in Council to do this. On 19 August this 
was done and, according to the official historian, the arrangement 
worked out very well due to the tact and care of the Admiralty, Naval 
Board and the Australian Government.^ 
WORLD WAR I DECLARED 
The Naval Board regarded the destruction of the German Pacific 
Fleet, under Admiral Von Spec, as the primary task. The German 
ships suspected by the Admiralty of being in the area were Gneisenau, 
(Armoured Cruiser), Scharnhorst, (Armoured Cruiser), Emden, 
Nurnberg, and Leipzig, (Light Protected Cruisers), Geier, Planet, 
(Survey Ship). 
In fact Geier had not arrived from Europe, but her sister ship Kor-
morant had. Wireless intelligence indicated that Schornhorst may 
have been in the German New Guinea Area. This plus the existence 
of the German coaling facilities and wireless station in the Rabaul-
Simpson Harbour area, made a concentration of the Australian fleet 
in that area a high priority. To this end the Australian ships rendez-
voused south of New Guinea, and proceeded in full expectation of 
meeting some units of the enemy fleet. On the evening of 11 August, 
the three destroyers {Yarra, Warrego and Parramatta) scouted into 
the area, while the Australia, Sydney and Encounter stood off. No 
enemy units were encountered and intelligence about the wireless sta-
tion was difficult to establish. Landing parties destroyed what com-
munication facilities were at Rabaul, and the ships then withdrew 
to refuel, after making a sweep through St. George's Channel. The 
Melbourne having initially been despatched to the Australian west 
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coast, was not able to rejoin in time for this first sweep. The A.E.I 
and A.E.2 had become ready for sea from refit in Sydney on 8 and 
10 August, respectively. 
Rear Admiral Patey had estimated that the Gneisenau and Scharn-
horst had withdrawn to the north or east of New Guinea. His estimate 
was accurate, but the sailing by the Admiralty and the New Zealand 
Government of an unprotected Naval contingent forced Patey to 
divert the Australia and Melbourne to their protection. On 30 
August, 1914, the New Zealand force occupied Suva without 
resistance, and Patey was free to return to New Guinea.^ 
As early as 6 August, the British Government had telegraphed the 
Dominion Governments of Australia and New Zealand that the 
seizure of the German wireless stations of Yap, Nauru, Samoa and 
New Guinea would be "a great and urgent Imperial service". 
NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN 
There was some thought that the British Government wanted early 
capture of German territories in case the war should be of short dura-
tion. The Naval Board was opposed to any action which detracted 
from the primary aim — the destruction of the German Pacific fleet; 
but agreed to the secondary aim of territorial acquisition after the 
first New Guinea sweep had failed to locate enemy cruisers. In fact, 
of course, the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst had withdrawn to the 
north and east and the first certain news of their whereabouts was 
not revealed until they descended on Apia, Samoa, on 14 September, 
1914. As is now well known they then turned south for a surprise 
attack at Suva, Count Von Spec being informed of the New Zealand 
landing and hoping to catch the Australia and other ships in a dawn 
raid. But only one neutral ship was in harbour and Von Spec refus-
ed to shell the buildings out of consideration for the civilian popula-
tion. The cruisers raided Papeete on 22 September, before continu-
ing on to South America to win at the battle of Coromel, and be 
sunk at the battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December, 1914, by 
Vice-Admiral Sturdee's British Fleet. 
To mount the New Guinea campaign, the transport Berrima 
(11,120 tons; P & O Company) was commissioned as an auxiliary 
cruiser under Commander Stevenson.' The naval contingent of 500 
men was embarked plus the army contingent under Colonel Holmes. 
The Berrima sailed north from Sydney on 19 August, 1914 and was 
escorted to Palm Island from Sandy Cape by the Sydney, which had 
come south from Port Moresby for the task. 
The needs of a submarine depot ship were to be met by the charter-
ing of S.S. Upolo on 18 August, 1914 from the Brisbane Milling 
Company Limited of South Brisbane at a cost of £500 sterling per 
calendar month. Coal burning, of 1141 tons gross register, length 
220 feet and built in 1891 with a maximum speed of only 10 knots 
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the Upolo proved unreliable mechanically and was not entirely 
suitable for the task.* 
The two submarines were ready to sail, but delays ensued with 
their parent ship, Upolo, and their escort. Protector. 
Naturally the submarine crews were keen to move north for what 
action they could find. The R.N. component of the crews, and 
especially the officers, probably regretted their lot in finding 
themselves on the other side of the world to the expected North Sea 
battles. They sailed on the 28 August and on the 2 September, join-
ed the other Australian ships near Palm Island, off the Queensland 
coast. From there they were despatched, because of their lower speed, 
to proceed so as to rejoin the fleet for the re-entry into Simpson Har-
bour (Rabaul). The submarines were at Port Moresby on 5 and 6 
September and then steamed on to Rabaul.^ 
On 9 September, the main naval force assembled off the 
Louisiades, consisting of ^us/raZ/fl, Sydney, Encounter, Warrego, 
Yarra, Parramatta, Berrima, store ship Aorangi and A.E.I and 
A.E.2 plus three colliers. They proceeded to the St. George Chan-
nel and on the 11th, the ships searched the whole area without sign 
of any of the German fleet. Intelligence available to Admiral Patey 
indicated two German wireless stations in the area, and the main 
aims of the expedition were their destruction and the elimination of 
enemy land resistance in the Rabaul-Simpson Harbour area. 
To this end the Australia placed a landing party of 27 men under 
Lieutenant R. G. Bowen, R.A.N, ashore at Kabakaul (near Rabaul). 
They met armed resistance and were later supported by a force of 
14 men from Yarra, and then 100 men from the Naval contingent 
in Berrima. This force put the German Bitapaka wireless station out 
of action the following day and,then retired. (The names of the men 
killed in this action are recorded on a plaque in what later became 
the Bitapaka War Cemetery, now maintained by the Commonwealth 
War Graves Commission.) A party of 30 men from the Sydney had 
landed at Herbertshohe (Kokopo) on the same mission. They were 
withdrawn on receipt of news of the success of the other landing 
party. On the 12th control of the town of Rabaul was achieved when 
Berrima unloaded four infantry companies and a machine gun sec-
tion at the Rabaul wharf. The German forces in the area comprised 
about 52 white men and 240 natives under the command of 9 Ger-
man officers. They had withdrawn inland after the first encounters. 
A written agreement not to provide armed resistance in the German 
New Guinea territories was handed over by the German Governor, 
Haber, to the Army commander. Colonel Holmes' on 17 September, 
1914. 
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LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE 
It was on 14 September, 1914, three days after the fleet commenced 
the operation, that A.E.I disappeared. During the first few days in 
the area the major fleet units were concerned with the landing opera-
tions at Rabaul Harbour and Herbertshohe as there was a require-
ment to guard against an attack from seaward. No definite 
knowledge of the whereabouts of the German ships was available. 
On the 13th the A.E.2 performed this task, accompanied by a 
destroyer and returned to harbour at dusk. On the \Alh A.E.I was 
given the task in conjunction with the Parramatta, then under the 
command of Lieutenant W. H. F. Warren, R.A.N. At 7.00am y4.£'./ 
left Simpson Harbour with orders to "patrol east of Cape Gazelle, 
in company with Parramatta keeping a lookout for any enemy, and 
return to harbour before dark". A.E.I joined Parramatta off 
Herbertshohe and the ships were off Cape Gazelle by 9.00am. At 
this stage, Parramatta signalled to A.E.I by wireless: 
Propose steaming to south 'ard ahead of you keeping in touch. 
Do you concur? What speed do you wish to go? 
Lieutenant Commander Besant m A.E.I, who was the senior of 
the two Commanding Officers, did not reply to the question, 
signalled: 
What orders have you got? 
and to which Parramatta replied: 
My only orders were to search to the south'ard with submarine 
and anchor off Herbertshohe at 5.30pm. 
The Parramatta then turned to the south and did a sweep down 
the centre of the channel between New Britain and New Ireland un-
til 12.30pm, when she reversed course. A.E.I proceeded north-east 
from Cape Gazelle and the two ships regained visual contact in the 
vicinity of the Duke of York Islands at 2.30pm. According to Lieute-
nant Warren's report the visibility was 9 to 10 miles earlier in the 
day and slowly decreased due to haze. At 2.30pm ^4.^ ".7 wirelessed 
to Parramatta: 
What is the distance of visibility? 
To which was replied: 
About 5 miles. 
At 3.20pm, the destroyer lost sight of A.E.I in the haze and revers-
ed course back to the south, steaming close to the coast, but did 
not see the submarine. A.E.I was last seen in a position which the 
Captain of Parramatta later marked on the chart as about 2 miles 
south-south-east of Berard Point, which is the eastern tip of the Duke 
of York Islands. Lieutenant Warren later reported that he thought 
that Lieutenant Commander Besant must have returned to harbour 
•iSSv..-.? 
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round the south of the Duke of York Islands so he had, therefore, 
reversed his course again and searched for the enemy north around 
the islands, thence steamed via Credner Island and anchored at 
Herbertshohe at 7.00pm.* 
THE SEARCH 
Sunset was at about 6.00pm and by the time the Parramatta had 
anchored the first doubts as to the safety oi A.E.I were raised. At 
7.00pm, Yarra proceeded on night patrol, but saw nothing. At 
8.00pm Rear Admiral Patey ordered Parramatta and Yarra to search. 
His alarm, of course, was tinged by the suspicion that A.E.I may 
have somehow entered into an engagement with the enemy fleet. At 
9.00pm, Sydney left to investigate a shore rumour (unfounded, as 
it happened) that the German Governor, retreating inland, was to 
embark in a ship on the west coast of the Gazelle Peninsula. She 
was warned to keep a lookout, but saw nothing. 
At daylight on the 15th the Encounter ']om&d the search and Par-
ramatta and Yarra made a sweep 30 miles to the north west of Duke 
of York Islands. Warrego, rejoining from accompanying the 
The A.E.I 
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Melbourne [o Kavieng, joined in. Motor boats were dropped from 
the ships and commandeered from shore and they carried out a 
systematic search of the coasts of the Duke of York and Credner 
Islands. During the morning of the 15th, Rear Admiral Patey inter-
viewed Lieutenant Stoker (Captain of the A.E.2) then at noon hand-
ed over the search to Encounter and sailed for Sydney where he was 
due on the 22nd. Both Sydney and Melbourne were due for refit 
in Sydney on that date prior to the three ships escorting the A.I.F. 
convoy from Australia at the end of the month.' 
No trace of the A.E.I was found in that search and no surface 
wreckage of oil, bodies or otherwise has ever been found. 
Only conjecture can be offered as to the cause of the first loss 
of a unit of the Australian fleet.'" 
RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS 
The submarine was not lost due to enemy action. A post war study 
of German records revealed no enemy units in the area at the time. 
Nor is there any evidence to her being lost as a result of collision. 
It is possible that she was lost by accident in carrying out a practice 
dive on the return to harbour. This could have occurred by a bat-
tery or other internal explosion, failure of some part of the hull or 
fittings, losing control of depth and being crushed, or striking some 
submerged object and being sunk as a result. The crew of this sub-
marine were proven as skilled and experienced, and Lieutenant Com-
mander Besant had shown competence and judgement in his ship 
handling. It is known that the starboard main motor was defective 
on that day, and this would have affected the manoeuvrability of 
the submarine to some extent when dived (but not the diesel propul-
sion when surfaced). Had the submarine dived, the skill and com-
petence of her crew may well have been of no avail if she struck either 
the reef off Credner Islands; or an uncharted pinnacle. Such pin-
nacles were certainly in the area and, in fact, Yarra damaged her 
propellers on one during the search for A.E.I. 
The effect of any collision with a reef could well be such as to 
rupture the pressure hull and so cause the loss of the boat. If the 
rupture was severe the water could rush in so quickly that it would 
blow the submarine apart. If it came in more slowly, then the boat 
could slowly fill and lose depth without blowing apart. In either case, 
the inrush of water would need to exceed the buoyancy effect of 
blowing the main ballast tanks and putting the hydroplanes to hard-
a-rise, otherwise the boat would not have sunk. 
Although a submarine is more prone to loss by accident when dived 
than surfaced, the circumstances indicate that A.E.I probably did 
not dive on that day. It was submarine practice to choose to dive 
in the morning if going to sea just for that day. This enabled all the 
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equipment tests to be carried out and also allowed the trim to be 
caught. Thus in the event of a subsequent dive the submarine would 
be immediately fully manoeuvrable, being trimmed to neutral 
buoyancy. The object of a trim dive is not achieved when the sub-
marine is headed home in the evening, because the circumstances 
affecting the trim will have changed by the next morning. It is possi-
ble that Chief Engine Room Artificer Wilson may have asked Lieute-
nant Commander Besant for a dive on the run home, in order to 
test some part of the submarine machinery not able to be tested on 
the surface. But it is unlikely that such a request would have been 
made. Even if it was, and Lieutenant Commander Besant was sym-
pathetic to it, the submarine had about 20 miles steaming to return 
to harbour, and at eleven knots this meant leaving the point at which 
she was last seen by Parramatta at about 4pm, in order to be in by 
dark at 6pm. On balance, therefore, it seems unlikely that A.E.I 
dived on that day. 
If not dived, then the reason for her loss must lie in the hazards 
that threaten any sea-going vessel. Visibility was no better than 5 
miles and accurate navigation would have been difficult. It is also 
known that strong currents affected the area. Modern charts show 
these currents run at up to 3 knots, depending on the effect of the 
monsoon for that year. According to the Pacific Islands Pilot Vol. 
1 (9th Ed.) 1976, p. 493:— 
The north-going tidal stream runs for about 7 hours, and the south-
going stream for 3'/: hours, at a rate of one to 3 knots. 
The prevailing current appears, near the Duke of York Group, to 
set southward, but it is much affected by the monsoons. 
Furthermore, the incidents of the jamming of the steering gear 
of the submarines on two occasions on the passage from England 
to Australia, showed that the helm was prone to failure. It seems 
a possibility, therefore, that the submarine was proceeding homeward 
sometime after 3.20pm and when skirting the Duke of York and 
Credner Islands, one or more of the factors of poor visibility, strong 
currents, or steering failure caused the submarine to strike the outer 
reef or an uncharted pinnacle close to it. The blow must have been 
enough to damage the pressure hull sufficiently to cause the boat 
to be lost. 
From just south of Berard Point to Simpson Harbour the likely 
planned route to betaken by A.E.I was south around Mioko Island, 
thence Kerawara Island, then almost due west, leaving Credner Island 
about 1 mile to port. (The two Credner Islands are referred to local-
ly as "Big Pigeon Island" and "Small Pigeon Island" because of 
the proclivity of wild pigeons on the islands.) 
It is likely that the submarine's navigator took advantage of the 
steeply sloping shelf falling away from the reef to attempt to pass 
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reasonably close to when turning the two corners. Because of the 
sharp fall off of the slope, uncharted coral niggerheads are unlikely 
at any distance off the reefs. The possibility, therefore, is that A.E.I 
struck at the north-eastern part of Credner Island (Big Pigeon 
Island). The spot had certain dangers because of the poor visibility 
and strong currents rendering navigation liable to error when chang-
ing points of land for fixing. The navigator then had to change from 
using the land astern to the islands to port for his navigational bear-
ings. The risk of error was increased because the haze had reduced 
the visibility. 
RECENT SEARCHES 
The search for the A.E.I still continues. As a result of interest 
taken by Commander John D. Foster R.A.N, in the history and loss 
of A.E.I the survey vessel H.M.A.S. Flinders (Lieutenant Com-
mander John Compton) was given permission to conduct a sonar 
search of the area in May 1976. Commander Foster was then serv-
ing as Deputy Commander of the Australian Defence Force Co-
operation Group in Papua New Guinea. The vessel put to sea on 
17 May, 1976 from Rabaul with Commander Foster and Mr Geof-
frey McKenzie, a former R.N. submarine Commanding Officer then 
resident in Rabaul, and searched with the vessel's sonar from Berard 
Point to the south around the Duke of York Island and thence across 
to Great Credner Island where it picked up a quite positive contact 
1,200 yards bearing 072 ° from the eastern most point of the island. 
The contact was not able to be identified further than it was cer-
tainly not a natural feature of the sea-bed, part of the difficulty aris-
ing from its lying in about 126 fathoms of water at the bottom of 
a shelving reef. However, Mr Ian Lockley (of Salvage Pacific 
Limited) in the yacht Tau kindly investigated the area with his deep 
diving controllable underwater unit in December, 1985 and positively 
identified the object detected by the Flinders as a rocky prominence; 
and was unable to locate any trace of the A.E.I." 
Having struck any part of the reef, any extensive damage would 
determine that the hull sank quickly. No wireless message was ever 
received bearing an SOS so it is probable that none was sent. This 
may have been because the end took only a few minutes as any longer 
period and the wireless operator would have had time to transmit. 
Alternatively it may have been that striking a reef disrupted all elec-
trical power supplies to the transmitter or the blow have brought 
the large wireless aerial crashing down and thus prevented any ef-
fective transmission. If the end came quickly, the hull may have sunk 
close to the reef; although it may have subsequently rolled or slid 
down the steep incline, or even have been washed down by the strong 
current. If the end had not come so quickly, the submarine could 
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well have drifted off in the current, while fighting to stay afloat, 
and been lost in any depth up to the nearby 450 fathom channels. 
Why no oil, bodies or wreckage was ever sighted is a mystery. It 
is possible that some tangible evidence did float to the surface, but 
was washed away by the current in the night. On striking any object 
the officer-of-the-watch would probably have immediately shut the 
upper conning tower hatch under him, leaving him and the lookout 
on the bridge. If this did happen, their bodies were never recovered. 
If the submarine had sunk quickly past her hull crush depth then 
there would have been an implosion and wreckage would certainly 
have floated up and been highly visible. So it is unlikely that the 
hull imploded as opposed to merely being holed and flooding. 
However she sank, the air from the hull must have all escaped by 
next day, or the hull would have been disco\ered by the rising air 
bubbles; as was the case when the British A.l was lost in 1904. 
H.M.A.S. A.E.I wilh ihe Australia and Yarra in the background. 
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The diesel oil employed in the " E " class submarines was stored 
internally. No oil was then carried in the saddle tanks, as in later 
classes. The saddle tanks of A.F.I were for main ballast use only. 
The oil was stored under the engines and control room mainly in 
double bottom tanks. Thus it would be possible for the hull to be 
damaged, the submarine to fill with water and sink, and even for 
the tanks to be crushed internally by seawater pressure; but still for 
no significant quantities of oil to escape. The viscosity of diesel fuel 
is considerably lower than that of furnace oil used by surface steam 
ships and so any quantity which did reach the surface would have 
dispersed, as well as bodily drifting away on the tide. Also diesel 
fuel is often difficult to see from sea level, as opposed to it being 
seen from an aircraft, and searchers could have passed through this 
type of oil slick without noticing. Any oil, or other wreckage, lost 
at 8.00pm could have been 27 miles away by sunrise the following 
day in a steady three knot current. The seasonal wind in the area 
in September is south-easterly at 10 to 25 knots, and this re-inforces 
the north-going current. It blows fairly consistently day and night 
although there is a tendency to weaken at night. With that sort of 
lead it was not likely to be found by the searching ships, who con-
ducted their search only out to a 30 mile radius and reached this 
radius after the tidal currents could well have taken any wreckage 
beyond it. 
All these points are factors bearing on the mystery of why no trace 
was found. No more definite conclusion could be drawn without fur-
ther evidence; and this could only be forthcoming from examina-
tion of the hull. 
The loss of A.E.I, coming only four months after the triumphant 
arrival of the submarines in Sydney, created a major impact. Patey's 
secret telegram was sent from the Australia to the Sub-District Naval 
Office at Thursday Island on 16 who relayed it to Navy Office. The 
Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon. G. F. Pearce, wrote: "Noted 
with regret" on his copy of it on 19 September. '^  The news was releas-
ed to the crew's relatives and to the press. The families of the three 
officers and the crew who had their families in the United Kingdom 
were informed through London. Navy Office, Melbourne, inform-
ed those in Australia. Messages of sympathy poured in from sources 
as disparate as Their Majesties, the King and Queen, and the Right 
Honourable Winston L. Spencer-Churchill, M.P., First Lord of the 
Admiralty, London, on the one hand, and the General Secretary of 
the Fruitgrowers' Association of New South Wales, Arcadia, 
N.S.W., on the other. A small black booklet was produced by Navy 
Office listing the men lost and recounting the messages of sympathy. 
It was distributed to the relatives of the men lost and to the relevant 
bodies who had Communicated their sympathy. 
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A.F.I was the first R.A.N, loss of World War 1. The only other 
loss occurred eight months later when the A.F.2 penetrated the Dar-
danelles on Anzac Day in a daring feat of seamanship but was subse-
quently sunk — but that of course is another story. 
In commemoration of the loss of A.F.I the Commonwealth War 
Graves Commission was presented with two plaques at H .M.A. 
Dockyard, Williamstown, Victoria on 2 November, 1968; the unveil-
ing being done by the then Commander of the Australian Submarine 
Squadron, Commander W. L. Owens, R .A.N. ' ' The plaques subse-
quently were mounted at the 1914-1981 Memorial at Bitapaka War 
Cemetery, New Britain, one of either side of a flag-staff.'"' 
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